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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
VICTOR CLINTON : Case No. 20080933-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance within a Correctional Facility, a third-degree felony in 
violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2)(a) and enhanced pursuant to U.C.A. §58-37-
8(2)(e) to a sentence of 1-15 years in prison. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
1 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED MAKE A 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
AFTER AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 466 
U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
BEEN ILLEGALLY SEIZED BY THE POLICE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for 
appeal, therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a 
defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been 
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obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT 
App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
POINT III 
WAS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER THE 
DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SEIZED FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE AND THEREFORE SHOULD IT HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not fully and properly preserved 
for appeal, and therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, 
a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 
UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) 
and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
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Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defen(s)e. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) Possession of a Controlled Substance Prohibited acts — 
Penalties. 
It is unlawful: for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under 
a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
§58-37-8(2)(e) Possession of a Controlled Substance Prohibited acts — 
Penalties. 
Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a 
penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), 
§78-2a-3(2)(e). Court of Appeals Jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; 
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE. 
Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
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RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in a single count information dated August 1, 
2007, with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance within a 
Correctional Facility, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) and (e). On August 6, 2007, the Defendant made an initial 
appearance. The Defendant waved his preliminary hearing, and the matter was set 
for trial on August 28-29, 2008, with the Honorable Judge Pamela G. Heffeman 
presiding. 
After a two-day jury trial, held August 28-29, 2008, the jury returned with a 
guilty verdict, and on October 7, 2008, the Defendant was sentenced to a term of 
one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. The Judgment, Sentencing and 
Commitment was filed on October 9, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was charged in a single count information dated September 11, 
2007, with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Jail or Prison, a 
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second-degree felony1, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (2)(a) with an 
enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (2)(e). 
Trial on this case was commenced on August 28, 2008; and after the jury 
had been selected and seated, the trial court proceeded to inform the jury that the 
Defendant had been charged with a second-degree felony controlled substance in a 
jail or prison. (R. 51) Apparently at that point in time, the Defendant began arguing 
with his counsel presumably that the charge should have been filed as a third-
degree rather than a second-degree felony. The trial court interrupted its colloquy 
to the jury and ask the Defendant to talk to his counsel after the jury was excused 
because "it's kind of hard for me to talk when you're talking at the same time, 
especially as loudly as you are talking." (R.157/ 52) 
During this loud and animated discussion between the Defendant and 
counsel, while the jury was in the courtroom, defense counsel told the Defendant 
"to shut the fuck up so we can keep going." Defense counsel acknowledged that 
The charge should have been a third-degree felony, based upon the language of 
the statute, with a sentencing enhancement added for the jail or prison finding. The 
trial court submitted to the jury a verdict form with the proper language, but with 
the improper designation of a second-degree felony. The trial court also submitted 
an interrogatory question with the verdict form for the jury to decide if the offense 
occurred in a jail or prison, using the appropriate language. At the time of 
sentencing, the trial court had discovered it's error and sentenced the Defendant 
pursuant to a third-degree felony with the jail/prison enhancement to a 1-15 year 
prison sentence. 
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this language set the Defendant off and he began saying "F—you punk, you can't 
sayF--you.M(R.157/61) 
The court thereafter took a recess and excused the jury to inquire into the 
problem. Defense counsel indicated that the Defendant expressed concerns about 
his continued representation, and the court made some inquiries into that issue. 
Specifically, the Defendant was concerned that he had been charged with a second-
degree felony instead of a third-degree felony and was concerned that his attorney 
did not understand and request a third-degree filing. (R. 157/54) When both defense 
counsel and the trial court refused to research the issue of a second-degree felony 
versus a third-degree felony, the Defendant, following counsel's lead, began using 
vile language in the court. The court thereafter found the Defendant in contempt of 
court for using this type language. 
The Court brought the jury back into the courtroom and inquired whether 
they had heard any "comment or discussion or statement" between the defendant 
and his counsel, to which the jury answered in the negative. (R. 157/62) 
The Defendant thereafter told the trial court set he had called defense 
counsel "over 60 day's straight.... and he refused to answer any of my calls." 
(R. 157/68) Mr. Cole then admitted that, "he has called in, I have been informed 
numerous times that he is called in from the jail; but at the time that he calls, he's 
told usually to call back on Fridays when Fm in the office most of the day. And on 
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those days he hasn't called back." (R. 157/69) The Defendant also stated that Mr. 
Cole had informed him when he first began representation that, "he hadn't even 
opened my file. He told me he hadn't opened my file at that time and that he wasn't 
going to and that I'd do another least(sic) three years on it and that's the truth." 
(R.157/70-71) 
After these exchanges, and further outbursts from the Defendant calling the 
trial court various derogatory names, the Defendant was removed from the 
courtroom. The Defendant was later asked by a jail personnel to return to the 
courtroom; however, he refused to do so, and the trial proceeded without him 
present. (R. 157/83) 
The evidence at trial established that on August 1, 2007, the Defendant was 
walking with a friend on Washington Boulevard and 20 Street in Ogden at 
approximately 4:30 a.m. (R.157/ 96-98). At this same time, Officer Robert Evans 
of the Ogden Police Department spotted the Defendant and his friend while they 
were walking. (R. 157/97). Officer Evans thought that he saw the Defendant 
holding a crowbar and assumed that he was attempting to burglarize a nearby 
automotive business. (R. 157/97). Before approaching the Defendant, Officer 
Evans called in for back-up to which Officer Scott Gardiner, also of the Ogden 
Police Department, promptly responded. (R. 157/99) Officer Evans approached the 
Defendant and realized that he was actually walking with a cane, not holding a 
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crowbar. (R. 157/98). He subsequently demanded both men to produce 
identification, which both did. (R. 157/98). Officer Evans then took their 
identification and ran both of their names through the report's management system 
to perform a warrants check and saw that the Defendant had an outstanding 
warrant. (R. 157/99) Officer Gardiner then took the Defendant into custody, placed 
him in handcuffs, and performed a search. (R. 157/109). 
Officer Gardiner searched the Defendant for "weapons or obvious signs of 
drugs or paraphernalia," and found nothing. (R. 157/109-110). Officer Gardiner 
then proceeded to transport the Defendant to the Weber County Jail. (R. 157/110). 
Before entering the jail, Officer Gardiner searched the Defendant a second time 
and again found no weapons, drugs, or paraphernalia. (R. 157/111). While 
searching the Defendant Officer Gardiner asked him if he has any drugs on him to 
which the Defendant gave no response. (R. 157/111). After this second search, 
Officer Gardiner took the Defendant into the pre-booking area to fill out some 
paperwork. (R. 157/111). 
After Officer Gardiner transferred custody of the Defendant to Deputy 
David Lockwood, deputy corrections officer for the Weber County Jail, (R. 
157/115), Deputy Lockwood performed a third search of the Defendant and found 
a baggy containing a small crystallized substance. (R. 157/117) A field test and a 
subsequent lab test confirmed that the crystallized substance was 
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methamphetamine. (R. 157/118, 123-124) Defendant was then charged with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance in a correctional facility. He was found guilty 
of both charges. (R 158/28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the 
Defendant was illegally seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under 
the U.S. Constitution, and under Article 1 Section 12 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. The secondary issue before this court is whether the evidence 
obtained after the illegal seizure constitutes "fruit of the poisonous tree". The final 
issue for the Court to determine is whether or not the Defendant was deprived of 
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. This issue is based upon 
trial counsel's utter failure to recognize and raise an illegal search and seizure 
issue. 
The evidence surrounding the seizure of the Defendant is uncontroverted. 
On August 1, 2007, Officer Evans of the Ogden Police Department acting without 
a warrant, without probable cause, and without even reasonable suspicion stopped 
two citizens and demanded proof of identification. Officer Evans then violated the 
Defendant's constitutional rights when, without reasonable suspicion, he 
confiscated the Defendant's identification, detained the Defendant, and performed 
a warrants check on his identification. 
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At no time, either before trial in a motion to suppress evidence or during the 
course of trial did the Defendant's trial counsel ever raise an objection to this 
blatant constitutional violation. The defense counsel's performance was so 
obviously deficient that the trial court should have stepped in and made some 
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the seizure. The discovery of the illegal 
substance was made as a direct consequence of the illegal seizure, and therefore 
the issue of prejudice to the Defendant is uncontroverted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO MOVE 
THE COURT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER 
AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was 
ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
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was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Not 
objecting to constitutional violations rise to one of the greatest deficiencies of 
ineffective counsel. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986), the Court was 
presented with a case almost identical to the case at bar where defense counsel, due 
to a failure to conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his 
conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court 
affirmed that reversal. In that affirmation of reversal the Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the 
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to 
demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 
365,375(1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally 
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent 
and pervasive failure to amake reasonable investigations or to make 
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under these circumstances, 
although the failure of the District Court and the Court of Appeals to 
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examine counsel's overall performance was inadvisable, we think 
this omission did not affect the soundness of the conclusion both 
courts reached — that counsel's performance fell below the level of 
reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged. 
{Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 (1986)) 
Quite similarly, in the instant case, the Defendant's trial counsel also 
neglected to file any motions to suppress evidence derived from the illegal seizure. 
During cross-examination of the police officers involved, counsel failed to ask 
what reason they had in stopping and detaining the Defendant. Counsel failed to 
object to the admission of the methamphetamine as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Counsel's performance may have been 'creditable enough' during the trial, but the 
overall performance from pretrial discovery to the end of the jury trial was utterly 
deficient, and his failure ought to have been recognized by the trial court. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this 
Court found that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment 
violation constituted error, as well as established reversible ineffective assistance 
of counsel. In that case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a situation where 
defense counsel had, in a pretrial motion, moved to suppress evidence on the basis 
of an illegal search. The trial court denied that motion based upon evidence at a 
preliminary hearing. During trial the officer altered his testimony establishing the 
lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The 
Court held that, "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable 
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legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland 
is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) 
Defense counsel's error in the present case was glaringly obvious to any 
observer. His failure to object to and have a hearing on the seizure of the 
Defendant clearly showed a deficiency. In Kimmelman v. Morrison infra, the court 
found reversible error in a case where trial counsel realized a Fourth Amendment 
issue, but brought it to the courts attention in an untimely manner. That untimely 
motion alone constituted reversible error. In State v. Gallegos infra., the court 
found error in trial counsel's failure to renew a previously denied motion to 
suppress. In the present case, counsel, as in Kimmelman, failed to make a timely 
motion to suppress a Fourth Amendment violation. However, unlike counsel in 
Kimmelman or in Gallegos, trial counsel in the case at bar was so deficient that he 
never even recognized that a Fourth Amendment question was at issue. 
Furthermore, "Counsel's performance at trial . . . suggests no better 
explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure." {Kimmelman) To the contrary, 
there is absolutely no conceivable reason for defense counsel not to make a pre-
trial motion to suppress this evidence. In the event that trial counsel had simply 
been dilatory in discovery, but had recognized the issue at the time of trial, he 
could have moved for a continuance to file and argue the motion. It is evident that 
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trial counsel was, however, oblivious to this significant and highly prejudicial 
issue. Since this motion should have been brought prior to trial, even the possible 
fear of somehow prejudicing the jury would be non-existent. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the 
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective the 
appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account 
such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
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Likewise, in State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the 
court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the admission of a tin canister 
that contained drugs, which was found during an illegal search. In that case the 
court held: "Because the evidence found in the tin was essential to the State's case 
on [drug possession] charges, admission of that evidence was obviously prejudicial 
to defendant." 
In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses the "entire 
evidentiary picture". If trial counsel had raised the illegal seizure issue, and if the 
trial court had correctly ruled on that issue, all of the evidence obtained after such 
violation would have been suppressed. In this case, that means the entirety of the 
evidence that supported defendant's conviction. These claims will be more fully 
argued and supported in points II and III below. 
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in 
the outcome of the trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
BEEN ILLEGALLY SEIZED BY THE POLICE. 
"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact 
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
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han nfi ll. Stati ? i ' Bn idh y, 2002 1 f I < Vpp 348 (See \ i.ls< :» Sti itt • v Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992)) In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 V - 10 
(Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not 
reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both 
,:• jou^ an- harmfulr I '1 le Cot irt I iirther '"-n,.- " An error is harmful if the 
:i!-. -i^ •. • u1- . differei it i *si ill: is csi lfficiei itly 1 ligl it to i n id.ermi.ne confidence m me 
verdict.'" (]\J - uiO) 
fhe first prong of the plain error test is showing thai r .^-w 
'In: avem case oi Kaupp v. Texas 02-5636 (U.S. 2003) the Supreme Court 
reiterated its long-standing position that the Fourth Amendment prohibits seizures 
of a person from a home. In Kaupp, the Court was presented with a situation 
where an officer w 1 10 w as iiiv estigating a murder went to the defendant's home at 
n i L j - n i<' .• •* * : e
 : J * • • ^ • . . ; u , • ^ K l i l t 
then said "OK", and the officer took him to the station for Mirandi/ed questioning. 
The Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction stated: 
A seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments occurs when "taking into account all the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 
'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty 
to ignore the police presence and go about his business'." (Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chestemut, 
486 U.S. 567,569(1988)) 
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The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Burningham, 10 P.3d 355 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2000) reversed the conviction of a defendant who was seized and 
searched at a friend's cabin by a police officer acting without a warrant. This 
reversal was in spite of the fact that the defendant was on probation, and the officer 
was following up on a tip that the defendant possessed illegal drugs. The Court 
held: "Thus, the search - supported only by reasonable suspicion - violated the 
appellant's Fourth Amendment rights." (Id at 357) See also State v. Valenzuela, 37 
P.3d 260 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001) The Court reversed a defendant's conviction where 
he was stopped in a public bank based upon a tip from an unknown informant that 
the defendant had committed a forgery. The defendant was arrested (level III), and 
a search revealed a controlled substance. The Court determined that a reasonable 
officer under the circumstances could not have had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the defendant had committed an offense; therefore, the seizure was 
unconstitutional. 
In the recent case of State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the 
Utah Supreme Court defined once again its' long-standing position on permissible 
levels of searches. In Hansen, the Court defined these levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-
coercive questioning by an officer. IdL Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 460 
U.S. at 498-99 
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j^ level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. 
Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Werking, 915 
F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an investigative 
detention or "Terry stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, probable cause '^  '.»•>• required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. 
Rather, when "specific .VK\ articulable facts and rational 
inferences.... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is 
committing a crime," an officer may initiate an investigative 
detention without consent, Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407, 
A level mree encounter involves at i arrest, which has been 
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] 
requires probable cause." Id. A level three encounter is also a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. Id. 
In further defining when a stop crosses the line from level-one to level-two, 
the Court in the case of State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. 4pp. 1997) 
stated: 
1he distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual 
encounter) and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable 
suspicion) depends on whether, through a show of physical force or 
authority, a person believes his freedom of movement is restrained. 
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 
1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). 
The I Jtah Court, of Appeals explains in detail the differences between 
"coiistitiitioilall) permissible encounters between police officers and the public." 
State v. Smith "SI l> M S'7<>. XK! (1 imh.l't \|>p I W ( . 
(ij [Ajn officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) 
an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable 
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suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being committed. Id. quoting State 
v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United 
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984))). 
In the case at bar, the encounter started off as a level-one stop. The officer 
simply asked the Defendant what he was doing and his name. After receiving a 
reasonable answer from the Defendant (he was going to get coffee), the officer 
then demanded to see identification from the Defendant. After confiscating the 
Defendant's identification, the officer detained the Defendant for the purpose of 
running a warrants check. It is reasonable to assume that a person would feel that 
his/her freedom and movement was restrained when a police officer confiscates 
proof of identification and detains them for the purpose of running a warrants 
check. 
The Supreme Court stated: 
An initially consensual encounter between a police officer and a 
citizen can be transformed into a seizure or detention within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 'if, in view of all the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.," IKS. v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210 (1984) quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
554(1983). 
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Once Officer Evans demanded tl ic idei ltificatioi 1 of tl le Defendant foi tl ic pi u: pose 
of checking for outstanding warrants, the Defendant had little choice but remain 
with the officer. Once the Defendant felt that he was not able to freely leave the 
presence of the officer, the seizure graduates to a level-two stop. The United States 
Supreme Coi n t ai tici dated tl lis ii i F lorida v. Bostick: 
Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply because 
a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. 
So long as a reasonable person would feel free cto disregard the 
police and go about his business,', the encounter is consensual and 
no reasonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it lose? its consensual nature. 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 42c>. ] ; VC: :^S2, 2585 (i991) 
quoting California v. Hodari IK 49*> U.S. hl\, 628, 690 (1991) 
(emphasis added) 
Mil* Supreme » Vnii'f in l*f\tridii i Royct\ 4<>U MS 4llM ( t^cSj) determined that 
s i m p i } • : - • ' { . ' . ^ . : : r - - i , k - r t . 1 " ' •••• • i / e ! L '• ; -.•• i,«: . . ^ ; e , -. u ;
 w 
under the Fourth Amendment, in Royer, when DIUL i r ' . ^ v ^ *;>•• \ • - \-. ;IP* 
agents found that the defendant matched a drug courier profile, the agents 
approached the defendant and asked him for his airplane ticket and driver's license, 
\vl ticiI the agents then examined \ majority of the Court believed that the request 
and exai ninatioi i. o:l 'the doci ii 1 lents were "permissible ii 1. themselves."''' Examining a 
citizen's identification in oncl of itself is m>t 1 ^ei/uie UPWCUT conii^catniL1 the 
identification while you search for outstanding warrants does consul ^ <ei •••«: e. 
The Court clarifies this: 
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Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his driver's license were 
no doubt permissible in themselves, but when the officers identified 
themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer that he was suspected of 
transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police 
room, while retaining his ticket and driver's license and without 
indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively 
seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 501 
In the present case, Officer Evans had the right to approach the Defendant 
and ask for his name and a brief explanation as to why he was there. The officer 
then moves closer to the edge by requiring the Defendant to produce his driver's 
license for examination in front of the Defendant. Certainly the first instance would 
be a level I stop, and the 2nd would potentially encroach into the level II area. 
However, when Officer Evans confiscated the Defendant's driver's license and 
detained him while he searched for outstanding warrants, the Defendant had reason 
to believe that his freedom of movement was restricted, and thus enhanced the 
seizure to a level-two stop. No reasonable person would have felt comfortable 
leaving in that situation since the aura of authority surrounding an officer who has 
confiscated an individual's identification would clearly indicate that the individual 
has lost his freedom to leave. Furthermore, the only way the individual could leave 
under those circumstances would be to abandon that which is rightfully his. 
There is no question that the encounter with the Defendant eventually went 
beyond a level-one stop since it involved physical detention and confiscation of the 
Defendant's identification for the purpose of performing a warrants check. The 
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obviousness of this issue also establishes the second1 prong of [he plain enoi lest, 
that the error should have been obvious to the trial court. 1 ^ * ^u , i i> . 
the seizure 01 the Defendant comprises a significant portion of the testimony at 
trial. I he trial court, therefore, should have been cognizant of both this issue as 
-., • ,;• UK* ^ ^..;i,,i;foiia; ; amifications of that issue. 
i ' i was 1 loi i-coi lsei isi ml is evident because the 
officer initiated the stop, and Defer idant woi ild 1 lave felt compelled to consei it to 
Officer Evan's request to present identification. It is sr • >fi,- e : • •* 
Defendant was not free to leave while the officer possessed his personal 
identification and ran the outstanding warrant check. The encounter is, therefore, 
a level-two stop * ic\ei-two stop requires reasonable suspicion, of which the 
facts have not established 
Reasonable si ispicion has beei I reqi in eel ii I : t:J le I 1 Jtal I cases in\ 'olving 
automobile or on-the-street seizures. The most glaring uis^ ••*-.-• f< r „ J 
to the case at bar: the case of Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274 (Utah 2000). In 
this case the I Ttah Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a defendant who 
was stopped . questioned b) the police while standing outside a 24-hour 
conveniens •• ,;- c »,;•. ec i *u '..- caak'u me p^nce to report that 
a lady had been standii ig outside tl le store for approxin lately two I: 101 it s 'Vlter some 
initial questioning of the defendant, the officer asked lo: 
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identification card. The officer then received consent to search her bag and found 
some paraphernalia. The Court ruled: "This level-one encounter escalated into a 
level-two stop when [the officer] retained Ray's identification while running the 
warrant check." {Id, at 280) The Court found that the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant for a warrant check and ruled that the 
subsequent discovery of the paraphernalia was unconstitutional. 
The present case is an identical scenario. Just as in Ray, the Defendant was 
detained on the street near a convenience store. Similarly, the Defendant was asked 
what he was doing and presented identification. The officer then ran a warrant 
check, just as in Ray, and found outstanding warrants. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Ray ruled that running a warrant check is a level-two seizure and must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion. The officer in Ray lacked reasonable suspicion 
to search for a warrant—even with a citizen complaint. Similarly, Officer Evans 
had absolutely no reason to believe that the Defendant was committing or had 
committed any crime. Officer Evans did not stop the Defendant because he 
recognized him to be a criminal. He was simply walking with his friend to get 
coffee. Officer Evans thought the Defendant had a crow-bar which turned out to be 
a cane; and the mere fact that the Defendant was walking in a high crime area at an 
early hour of the morning does not constitute reasonable suspicion. Fourth 
Amendment rights do not have a curfew. 
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In the case of State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah, 1986), the coi iii 
was presented with a similar scenario wherein an officer detained an individual for 
driving slowly late at nipht ir r hi :h crime area T: •)-.a -,.tsc fhe Utah Supreme 
Court affirms WK- \v\i\\ court 's decision to exclude evidence due to a Fourth 
•\mendment lohlion in haltlm,1, ' 1 he stop \wis based morels uii the tael dial a ear 
witl i. oi it of-state license plates w as n loving slowl) ' throi igh a i leighborl lood late at 
night." The facts in the present case are virtually identical to those in Carpena and 
neither support reasonable suspicion for a level to detention. 
' I he ill lal pi oi ig of 1:1 le plan i erroi test is 1 lai i i i 1 1 le Court has held that, "An 
eiToi is 1 larmi i il ii tl le likelihood of a different i esi ill; Is 'si ifficiei it to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (the State v. Olsen, 809 P.2u HAM, IUIO 
(Utah App. 1994) In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses 
the "entire evidentiary picture". {Strickland v. Washington infra.) If trial counsel 
had raised the illegal seizure issue, anil w me inal court had correctly ruled on that 
issue, all of the e\ idei IC e obtaii led aftei sue 1 I violation wo .. 'ia\ e been 
suppressed. In llii> rase tluif niratr. llir rii l i irh nl Ihf cviilenee thai supported 
Defendant's conviction. 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER THE DEFENDANT 
WAS ILLEGALLY SEIZED CONSTITUTES FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE AND THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally 
impermissible seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this 
constitutional violation effect the subsequent evidence. In the case of Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "The 
exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials 
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." The Court 
further reinforced the gravity of Fourth Amendment protections of the person by 
stating: 
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees 
of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, this Court held nearly half a century ago that 
evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof 
against the victim of the search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383. 
The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the 
direct products of such invasions. {Wong Sun v. United States, at 484) 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App. 1998) 
this Court held: 
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Absent an exception to the exclusionary i ule, Mapp requires us to 
exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct at 1691. There is 
no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic 
checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there any dispute that, absent 
the good faith exception, all evidence obtained subsequent to 
defendant's stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 I J. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 
9; .Ed.2d441 (1963). 
All of the evidence gathered against tl le Defendai it ii i the present case sten is fron I 
the initial illegal seizure and subsequent search of the Defended! M ; ^ •'•• 'K!•-• 
should never have been arrested. After a simple examination of the Defendant's 
identification. Officer Evans should have excused the Defendant. There was no 
reasonable suspicion to run a warrant check, and any evidence gathered against the 
Defendant aftei ai 11 n ICOI istitutioi ial search ougl: it to be entirely suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court 
reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
DA I hi; this / 7 day of August 20Q9r ^  
RANDALL (W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT A 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
VICTOR CLINTON, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071901735 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: October 7, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: roxanneb 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE, PDA 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 20, 1961 
Video 
Tape Number: 3C 100708 Tape Count: 255-300 
CHARGES 
1. POSS C/S WITH IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/29/08 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by Roy 
Cole, The Court hears from counsel and proceeds with sentencing. 
The Court sentences the defendant as if he were found guilty of a 
second degree felony based upon the enhancement. 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
CD24568045 
071901735 CLINTON,VICTOR 
pages: 2 
Page 1 
Case No: 071901735 
Date: Oct 07, 2008 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS C/S WITH IN 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court orders defendant to serve an additional 3 65 days to run 
consecutive to the sentence imposed based upon the defendant being 
found guilty of the enhancement as per statute. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends defendant receive credit for time served while 
at the Weber County Jail. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
VERNON RAYMOND ABEYTA 
Dated this day of 2^ 2008 
PAMELA ^G .^HEFFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
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